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The Energy Modeling Forum 28 (EMF28) performed a large-scale model comparison exercise
to illustrate different technology pathways for cutting European greenhouse gas emissions by
80% by 2050. Focusing on selected countries (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and UK), this
paper first analyzes climate and energy policy objectives and debates in the respective countries.
It then compares EMF28 model results to the short-term projections of the National Renewable
Energy Action Plans (NREAPs) and the long-term transformation pathway given in the Eu-
ropean Commission’s “Energy Roadmap 2050”. It concludes that there is sufficient agreement
with the NREAPs and national policies to accept the model results as conceivable scenarios.
The scenarios suggest that in the future a variety of different national energy mixes will continue
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to reflect the different resource bases and preferences of individual Member States. In order to
ensure a cost-efficient transformation, it is important to improve coordination between Member
State policies and those at the EU level.
Keywords: European climate and energy policy; National Renewable Action Plans (NREAPs);
environmental federalism; mitigation scenarios.
1. Introduction
The European Union (EU) has set an aspirational goal of an 80–95% reduction in
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050 relative to 1990 levels (European Council,
2009), confirmed by the European Council (2011). This long-term climate mitigation
target is underpinned by three mid-term targets specified for the year 2020, known as
the 20-20-20 targets1: reducing GHG emissions by 20%, increasing the share of re-
newable energy in final energy consumption to 20% and improving energy efficiency
by 20%. Even though the 20-20-20 targets are formulated at the level of the EU as a
whole, the actual policies required to achieve them will need to be implemented at
Member State level. As part of the Renewable Directive (European Union, 2009),
Member States had to report their strategy on the deployment of renewable energies in
the official National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs) (EEA, 2012).
In 2011, the European Commission launched a debate on the long-term climate
mitigation strategy by issuing three roadmap documents: on a low carbon economy
(European Commission, 2011b), on transport (European Commission, 2011d) and the
“Energy Roadmap 2050” on transforming the energy system (European Commission,
2011c). Despite the fact that the European Commission sees the Energy Roadmap 2050
as “the basis for developing a long-term European framework” (European Commission,
2011c), aspects related to energy strategies remain national responsibilities. According
to Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (European Union, 2010) all
measures needed to preserve and improve the environment “shall not affect a Member
State’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice
between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply”. Thus,
the domestic energy mix ultimately lies within the sovereignty of Member States.
However, individual national preferences and policies play an important role in national
strategies that together determine the success of European long-termmitigation strategy.
Recently, several modeling studies (including the EMF28 study, Knopf et al., 2013)
analyzed the energy transition within the EU that would be necessary to meet the long-
term climate mitigation target. In the Energy Roadmap of the European Commission
(European Commission, 2011a,c), different pathways to decarbonize the European en-
ergy system, depending on the specific technological setting, have been analyzed by
means of a model of the European energy system. Other studies focus solely on Europe as
a single entity and less on the interplay between specific national and European strategies.
1For more information consult: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index en.htm.
B. Knopf et al.
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Some recent examples are the “Power Choices” study by Eurelectric (2009), with a focus
on the power sector, and the “Roadmap 2050” by the European Climate Foundation
(2011) that investigated a number of pathways with different shares of renewables.
Since these studies analyze the energy system transformation in Europe as an
aggregate of 27 different energy mixes, they do not dig further into the inter-rela-
tionship between national and European strategies. The Energy Roadmap, for example,
concludes that several different strategies to reach decarbonization in Europe are
possible, but that they all show that “renewables rise substantially, [. . . ] that carbon
capture and storage (CCS) has to play a pivotal role in system transformation [. . .] and
that nuclear energy provides an important contribution” (European Commission,
2011c). However, it is not stated whether these conclusions hold equally for all
Member States or whether national strategies may deviate substantially from this.
From the perspective of the European Commission, Article 194 determines that they
do not have a mandate to influence Member States’ choice concerning certain tech-
nologies. Yet, when it comes to translating these technology pathways into policy
measures for implementation, it is of fundamental importance to understand what the
European energy transition demands at the level of individual Member States.
This paper makes a first attempt to overcome this gap in research by analyzing the
transition within selected Member States and relating it to the European transformation.
To our knowledge this is the first attempt to relate the EU Energy Roadmap to model
results and policies of individual Member States. Our analysis is based on model sce-
narios generated in the Energy Model Forum (EMF) 28 model comparison (see Knopf
et al., 2013). In this paper, we look in more detail at the country level strategies within
these scenarios. In order to keep our analysis manageable, we focus on a limited number
of selected countries as case studies for which a critical number of model results are
available: France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and UK. Except for Sweden, these countries
constitute the four largest emitters and together account for more than 55% of the
European CO2 emissions.
2 These five Member States cover the spectrum of energy
mixes across Europe, ranging from coal-based countries, such as Germany, to those with
high shares of hydro energy, such as Sweden. The key questions are:
(1) What are the national policies and roadmaps to achieve the overall European target
of 20% emission reduction and 20% renewables by 2020 and 80% emission
reduction in the long-term?
(2) Are models able to capture different approaches in national energy mixes? How do
the model scenarios compare to the actual short-term political ambitions as
expressed in the NREAPs? What do models project for the long-term future
development of the energy mix for the Member States?
(3) What are the policy implications that can be drawn from this analysis?
2It should be noted that in order to cover the full European perspective it would be of utmost importance to also include
the eastern-European countries in this analysis, especially as Poland for example is the sixth largest emitter. Unfor-
tunately, due to the lack of participants in EMF28 from eastern European countries this aspect could not be covered.
Transforming the European Energy System
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1.1. Participating models and scenario set-up
From the 13 models participating in EMF28 and presented in Knopf et al. (2013), six
provide results on a regional level for Europe, see Table 1. The models differ with
respect to their economic and geographical coverage, as well as their inter-temporal
solution methodology and options to trade energy carriers. This affects the degree of
flexibility as to when and where given mitigation targets will be achieved. All models
resort to simplifying assumptions based on economic theory, e.g., perfect markets or
symmetric information, and generate normative scenarios that show what needs to be
done in a specific scenario setting in order to achieve exogenously set mitigation
targets. Therefore, model results can be compared with real developments and political
ambitions in the respective Member States as stated, for example, in the NREAPs. The
model scenarios also provide long-term transformation pathways that can serve as a
basis for policy makers to derive mitigation strategies.
With respect to the sectoral and geographical coverage, there are two global models,
one of which covers all sectors of the economy, splitting Europe into five aggregate
regions (FARM-EU) while the other only covers the energy sector, but represents each
of the individual 27 Member States (POLES). There are three models of the European
Table 1. Models of the EMF28 modeling comparison exercise considered in this analysis.
Economic coverage Geographic coverage
(number of EU
regions)
Inter-temporal solu-
tion methodology
International trade
FARM EU [A] Full economic cov-
erage in CGE
Global (5) Recursive dynamic All commodities
POLES [B] Partial equilibrium
model of the
energy sector
Global (27) Recursive dynamic Fossil fuels
PRIMES [C] Partial equilibrium
model of the
energy sector
EU (25) Perfect foresight in
power sector,
10-year fore-
sight in demand
sectors
Electricity and gas
in Europe
TIMES PanEU
[D]
Partial equilibrium
model of the
energy sector
EU (23) Inter-temporal opti-
mization with
perfect foresight
Electricity, biomass,
biofuels
PET [E] Partial equilibrium
model of the
energy sector
EU (25) Inter-temporal opti-
mization with
perfect foresight
Electricity, biomass,
biofuels
EMELIE-ESY
[F]
Partial equilibrium
model of the
electricity sector
EU (27þ2) Inter-temporal opti-
mization with
perfect foresight
Electricity
Notes: [A] (Sands et al., 2013); [B] (Criqui and Mima, 2012); [C] (Capros et al., 2012); [D] (Blesl et al.,
2012); [E] (Kanudia and Gargiulo, 2009); [F] (Traber and Kemfert, 2012; Schroeder, 2012). All six
models provide results for France, Germany, and UK. Five models provide numbers for Italy and Sweden.
B. Knopf et al.
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energy sector designed on a country basis (PRIMES, TIMES-PanEU, PET) and one
model that is confined to the electricity sector (EMELIE-ESY). The degree of when-
and where-flexibility in the models differs, both due to how the time dimension is
treated in the solution methodology and which energy carriers are considered for
trade across countries. When-flexibility in myopic models that solve with a recursive
dynamic method is much lower than in models that assume perfect foresight over the
modeled time horizon. Inter-temporal optimization models with perfect foresight do
not assume any burden sharing of CO2 reduction according to GDP or any similar
measure, but implicitly assume an emission trading market (with no transaction costs
and perfect information). Except for POLES, electricity is tradable in all models,
allowing for full where-flexibility in the power sector.
The starting point for the analyses in this paper is the scenario definition of the Energy
Roadmap 2050 (European Commission, 2011c), in particular the “Diversified supply
technologies” scenario. We investigate a mitigation scenario with 80% GHG reduction
by 2050, referred to as 80% DEF scenario in Knopf et al. (2013).3 All models assume
their default technology setting, including the carbon capture and sequestration (CCS)
technology. Specific national technology policies and renewable supporting schemes are
not represented in the models, with the exception of the consideration of nuclear phase-
outs in some countries. The scenario assumes that the EU takes leadership of the global
climate policy regime by committing unilaterally to an emissions reduction target of
80%, while the rest of the world continues with moderate targets.
2. National Energy Mixes, Policies and Roadmaps
The status quo in the selected countries (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and UK) is
reflected in the 2010 energy mix. Primary energy mixes clearly differ among Member
States, see Fig. 1. Oil is the only fuel that is used to a similar extent in all Member
States because fuel for all modes of transport is predominantly based on oil products.
While the transport sector, based on almost 100% oil, is structurally the same across
Member States, the most substantial differences can be seen in the power sector, see
Fig. 2. Some observations really stand out for the selected Member States: (i) a high
proportion of nuclear in France, (ii) substantial use of coal in Germany, (iii) relatively
high share of natural gas use in Italy, (iv) an almost 100% use of non-fossil electricity,
i.e., hydro, biomass, and nuclear in Sweden, and (v) a fossil based system with a
mixture of coal and gas in the UK.
In the following sections, we analyze national policies in the five selected countries.
Some Member States have also formulated national roadmaps that present plans and
scenarios to achieve climate reduction targets. This can be seen, for example, in
Notenboom et al. (2012) which gives a very comprehensive overview of roadmaps for the
3We concentrate here on the mitigation scenario EU6 and do not consider the reference scenario EU1 with 40% GHG
reduction by 2050, as in Knopf et al. (2013) it was shown that the strategic differences on technology choices between
the two scenarios are not substantial, especially in the electricity sector which is the focus of the analysis in this paper.
Transforming the European Energy System
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north-western European countries. In this section, for each of the five countries, we will
give a short introduction to the political targets, current debates and preferences on
national GHG reduction targets and on attitudes towards low carbon technologies such as
renewable energy sources (RES), nuclear, and CCS and relate this to the model scenarios.
2.1. France
In France, the energy law of 2005 (Grenelle de l’environnement) laid down targets for
(i) GHG emission reductions of 40–45% by 2030 and 75% by 2050, (ii) the share of
renewables to be 23% by 2020 in line with the French commitment to the 20-20-20
targets, and (iii) energy efficiency. Recently, a number of studies on energy system
transitions up to 2050 have been presented by Government and other organizations
(ADEME, 2012; Percebois and Mandil, 2012; Association négaWatt, 2011). None of
Figure 2. Electricity generation in EU27 and selected Member States in 2010. Data based on
Eurostat (2013b).
Figure 1. Primary energy mix in EU27 and selected Member States in 2010. Data based on
(Eurostat, 2012).
B. Knopf et al.
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these can be considered as official scenarios, but they have the merit of testing different
assumptions on mid-term and long-term GHG emission reduction. At the end of
November 2012, the French Minister for Ecology launched a public debate on the
Government’s proposals on how to achieve the European 20-20-20 targets and the
pledge of the French president to cut nuclear energy from 77% in 2011 to 50% of
France’s power mix by 2025.
There are differing opinions concerning the future of nuclear energy; currently,
nuclear energy is the dominant technology for power generation in France and
extending the lifetime of existing plants is seriously considered, because this appears to
be the cheapest way to generate low-carbon power. This option, however, is not in line
with the electoral commitment of François Hollande to reduce the role of nuclear
energy over the coming years. French energy industry leaders do not approve of the
move away from nuclear power.
France has a large potential for RES, especially for onshore wind. However, social
acceptance is sometimes lacking. In addition, France has relatively large agricultural and
forest areas available per capita, which indicates that biomass production could be im-
portant in the future, especially for transport. Furthermore, France has a relatively large
potential for solar energy production in the south of the country and expects natural gas to
provide flexibility in the electricity system. The French Minister for Ecology has an-
nounced that the Government has not closed the door on the discussion of exploration for
shale gas, but hydraulic fracturing process is prohibited because of environmental con-
cerns. TheGovernment has recently rejected seven applications to develop France’s shale
deposits. Currently, France exports a large quantity of base-load electricity. More wind
and solar power in the surrounding countries will lead to additional production to cover
the peak demand in these countries, which will influence France’s export potential.
2.2. Germany
The German Government has released a set of energy and climate targets for both the
mid-term period and the target year of 2050 in its Energy Concept (Federal Government,
2010). The GHG reduction targets of 80–95% by 2050, compared to 1990 level, with
interim targets of 40% (2020), 55% (2030), and 70% (2040), are not binding but they
declare intentions and serve as a reference point. The Government has no official scenario
but a few studies serve as a basis for designing a long-term strategy. The “Leitstudien”
(Lead studies) (DLR/IWES/IFNE, 2010, 2012) commissioned for the Federal Ministry
for the Environment (BMU) play an important role in renewable deployment. They also
served as a basis for the NREAPs and provide orientation for the targeted quantities of
installed capacities supported by the feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme for RES. In addition, the
“Energy Scenarios for an Energy Concept of the Federal Government” (EWI/GWS/
Prognos, 2010) are an important point of reference. The targets for installed RES ca-
pacities in the Energy Concept agreewith selected numbers from the “Leitstudie” as well
as the “Energy Scenarios” — though without explicitly stating so. An official scenario
Transforming the European Energy System
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framework for network planning of the electricity grid was recently published. This
included an extensive public consultation process (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012).
The German Government decided to phase-out nuclear energy by 2022. This was
initially agreed in 2000 and confirmed in 2011 after the Fukushima nuclear accident.
While phasing out nuclear energy, Germany intends to substantially increase the
deployment of RES. In this respect, it is important to note that in Germany the CO2
targets are not legally binding, unlike the targets for renewables. Germany has a very
ambitious target of reaching a minimum share of 80% renewables in the electricity mix
by 2050, as specified in the Renewable Energy Act. Recently, the development has
been very dynamic, particularly in the electricity sector. The share of renewables has
nearly tripled in the last decade from 8% in 2002 to 23% in 2012 (BDEW, 2013a).
Despite the nuclear phase-out, Germany is still a strong exporter of electricity with
net exports in 2012 reaching a peak at more than 20 TWh (BDEW, 2013b). This
compares to a domestic consumption of roughly 600 TWh. These exports were mainly
to the Netherlands (BDEW, 2013b), displacing the Dutch gas power plants that now
face the problem of declining competitiveness in the joint European market. This effect
emphasizes that unilateral national activities in the liberalized market will clearly have
an effect on neighboring countries, see, for example, Fischer and Geden (2011).
2.3. Italy
In March 2013, the Ministry of the Economic Development released the final version
of the 2020 National Energy Strategy (Strategia Energetica Nazionale) (Ministero dello
Sviluppo Economico, 2012) after a consultation with institutions, trade unions and
social partners on the contents of the first draft produced in October 2012. The report
indicates that the overall electricity demand will remain roughly constant until 2020
(345–360 TWh against 346 TWh in 2010). Electricity supply is expected to be
obtained as follows: 35–40% from gas, 35–38% from RES, 15–16% from coal, 7–10%
from imports, 1% from oil, and 2% from other sources. The electricity mix is thus
supposed to continue to rely on a mixture of natural gas and RES (c.f. Fig. 2), even
though the focus partially transfers from gas to RES.
The new target for the share of RES in electricity production is, at 35–38%, well
above that reported in the NREAPs of 26%. The RES share in the gross final energy
consumption is also higher: 19–20% (from 10% in 2010) compared to the European
17% NREAP target. This reformulation of the Italian target has also become necessary
in the light of the massive deployment of solar PV plants in 2010 and 2011 which was
boosted by a very favorable FIT support scheme. An intense, though lower, devel-
opment also took place in 2012. The installed capacity, which was 38MW in 2005 and
431MW in 2008, increased to 12.8GW in 2011 and reached a level of 16.4GW at the
end of 2012 (APER, 2008; GSE, 2013b), while the target indicated in the NREAP,
released in June 2010, was 8GW by 2020.
Nuclear has been discarded as an option for the future in Italy. The Government
had recently planned a re-start of this technology, which was abandoned in the late
B. Knopf et al.
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1980s after a referendum following the Chernobyl incident; nuclear was planned to
contribute 25% of the domestic production in some 20 years. However, after the
Fukushima nuclear accident another referendum was held, and because there was a
clear public aversion to this option, all plans for new nuclear power plants have been
abandoned. As a consequence, nuclear will not be deployed in the country in the short
or medium-term.
There is a very different picture for the use of CCS. In Italy, a small pilot plant exists
in Brindisi (capturing 8 ktCO2/yr) and a large-scale demonstration plant (1MtCO2/yr)
is being built in Porto Tolle, although it faces some bureaucratic problems. A major
application of CCS in the forthcoming decades could therefore be a possibility. It is
important to point out that the storage capacity of carbon dioxide in the country has
been assessed to be 13.3GtCO2 (Caliri and Panei, 2012). Considering that the overall
annual production of carbon dioxide in 2010 was 404MtCO2 storage capacity does not
represent a constraint for the deployment of CCS.
2.4. Sweden
Sweden’s long-term vision is to decarbonize the economy by 2050. However, this
vision includes sinks and international trade of carbon credits. By adopting existing
Swedish nuclear policy, which sets limits to additional new nuclear reactors but allows
the replacement of old ones, there is no real obstacle in envisaging Swedish electricity
to be 100% fossil-free in the long term. However, the Government’s vision that by
2030 Sweden will have a vehicle fleet that is independent of fossil fuels would defi-
nitely be a challenge. Another challenge is to decarbonize Swedish energy intensive
industries, which needs the adoption of CCS in steel and cement, as well as pulp and
paper industries (IEA, 2013; Regeringskansliet, 2009, 2013).
Today Sweden has a diverse energy mix with high shares of non-fossil primary
energy (approximately 38% in 2010), generated from hydro, biomass, and nuclear;
nearly 100% electricity production comes from non-fossil fuels due to high shares of
hydro and nuclear. Bioenergy is the main source of renewable energy supply in
Sweden, and is primarily produced and used in pulp and paper industries. Biomass is
also used in district heating and for combined heat and power production (co-gener-
ation). Over the last decade, wind power has become an increasingly important source;
generation reached 6 TWh in 2011, and the increase was 75% over the year 2010. On
the other hand, solar is only a limited resource due to Nordic conditions (IEA, 2013).
The Swedish Parliament has adopted a national overall target for renewable energy
of one percentage point above the target given in the NREAPs. This means that the
proportion of RES in the total final energy consumption is expected to be 50.2% in
2020. In the electricity sector, in the NREAPs the Federal Government estimates that
there will be a 62.8% share of renewable energies in by 2020. The share in the heating/
cooling sector will be 62%, while in the transport sector it will amount to 12.4%.
The Swedish electricity system is part of the Nord Pool Spot market, which trades
within participating countries and Central Europe. Within Nord Pool Spot, Norway,
Transforming the European Energy System
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Finland, Denmark, and Sweden are the largest electricity trading partners. The Nord
Pool market is characterized by a high share of both hydro and wind, and therefore the
net export/import balance depends significantly on the climatic conditions. During
cold winters, more electricity is also used for heating, which has an impact on the net
export/import balance. Due to a growing share of variable generation in Central
Europe, an increasing number of European countries are dependent on the balancing
power from the Nordic region. Therefore, more interconnections are expected to be
built between the Nordic region, including Sweden, and Central Europe.
Decarbonizing the Swedish industrial sector would require the application of CCS,
which would be a challenge as Sweden does not have any suitable storage sites; it
would mean that captured CO2 would have to be transported to the North Sea or to
some other storage site. On the other hand, Nordic studies, and recently the Interna-
tional Energy Agency (IEA), have indicated that Sweden has good potential to apply
bio-CCS to its pulp and paper industries or co-firing boilers using both biomass and
fossil fuels (IEA, 2013; Teir et al., 2010).
2.5. United Kingdom
The UK has a legally binding long-term target to reduce GHG emissions by 80% by
2050, established by the Climate Change Act in 2008 (UK Gov, 2008). The transition
towards this long-term target is being managed through five-year long carbon budgets,
which help to reduce planning uncertainty for prospective investors. The latest of such
assessments focused on the period 2023–2027 (Committee on Climate Change (CCC)
2010; HMG, 2011). There are no policies in place that would exclude a specific tech-
nology option and a variety of technologies are expected to contribute in the future.
There exists no official UK scenario, but the Government contracts scenario work
for advice on current issues (Committee on Climate Change (CCC), 2010; AEA,
2011a,b). This can also be seen in Ekins et al. (2013), which compares a number of
recent UK MARKAL scenarios, including those of CCC and AEA. Additionally, a
number of other studies investigate the transition towards a low carbon or even zero
carbon future for the UK, for example WWF (2011) and CAT (2010).
A number of national policy instruments were implemented to reduce emissions and
increase the contributions from low carbon options. Renewables for electricity gen-
eration are directly supported through the renewables obligation, a green certificate
scheme aimed at large facilities, and a FIT scheme for the renewable plants that have a
capacity below 5MW. The proposed electricity market reform would, however, in-
troduce new measures such as “contracts for difference” and “emissions performance
standard”. The former of these would in time replace the renewables obligation, in
addition to supporting other low carbon electricity, such as CCS and nuclear. Addi-
tionally, a carbon price floor will be in place from 1st April 2013 onwards. The carbon
price floor is essentially a tax on fossil fuels used for electricity generation. It is
expected to be £16/tCO2 in 2013, £30/tCO2 in 2020, and £70/tCO2 in 2030 (in
B. Knopf et al.
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2009 prices). A number of instruments aimed at reductions in other sectors also exist
(e.g., Climate Change Levy, Carbon Reduction Commitment, and Renewable Heat
Incentive).
In terms of technologies, the UK can support a range of options as it has CCS storage
options available, supports the building of new nuclear plants and has good wave and
wind resources. For CCS the Department of Energy and Climate Change recently
published a roadmap (DECC, 2012), which sets as a goal the “commercial deployment
of CCS in the UK in 2020s”. The Government also launched the second competition for
building a commercial scale CCS facility, after the first competition failed to lead to a
successful project. Considerable CCS deployment is projected, with a median value of
captured emissions of 120 MtCO2 and a 25% share of electricity from fossil-CCS in
2050. Concerning nuclear, the UK policy supports the building of new nuclear capacity
but the realization of the projects depends on the companies finding such investments
economically lucrative. There are currently three consortiums with plans to build new
nuclear capacity in the UK. Additionally, the Government announced that exploratory
hydraulic fracturing for shale gas could resume in the UK, which could eventually lead
to a significant increase in the domestic natural gas production. The UK has excellent
wind resources and this is incorporated in the projections made in the NREAP, which
projects about 15GW of onshore and 13GW of offshore capacity for 2020.
3. Model Perspectives for Transforming the Energy Sector
In this section, we come back to the second set of key questions raised in Sec. 1 — are
models able to capture the diversity of national energy mixes and different national
preferences and policies described in the previous section? How do the model sce-
narios compare to the actual short-term political ambitions as expressed in the
NREAPs? What do models project for the long-term future development of the energy
mix for the Member States?
3.1. Short-term model projections: Comparison with NREAPs
In the 20-20-20 package, the EU has committed to raising the share of EU energy
consumption produced from renewable resources to 20% by 2020 (European Union,
2009). Member States have laid down their plans of how they expect to reach this legally
binding target in the NREAPs including interim steps required up to 2020. These
deployment plans can therefore be seen as a vision by policy-makers on the deployment
of renewables for their respective country. In the following, we compare these short-term
and medium-term visions, provided in the NREAPs, with model results.
Based on the NREAPs, the most important contribution of renewable electricity
technologies for the year 2020 is expected to be from wind power (41%). The second
largest provider is expected to be hydropower (30%). Biomass electricity will con-
tribute 19% and solar electricity 9% (EEA, 2012). EMF28 results in general support
this ranking of the importance of technologies, indicating contributions of 35% from
Transforming the European Energy System
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wind, 38% from hydro, 18% from bioenergy, and 7% from solar in 2020. Figure 3
gives the electricity production for wind, biomass, and solar envisaged by the
NREAPs,4 the median of the models for 2020, and the historic values for 2005, 2010,
and 2012 for comparison. This shows that EMF28 models also support the absolute
Figure 3. Electricity generation in EU27, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and UK for wind (on
and offshore), biomass and solar PV. Comparison is made of historic data, NREAP projections for
2020 (EEA, 2012) and EMF28model scenario results for 2020. For the historic data the following
sources are used: EEA (2012) for 2005 and 2010; Eurostat (2013a) for 2012 forwind, and for 2011
for solar and biomass. In addition, the following data is used for 2012: RTE (2012) for solar and
biomass for France; BDEW (2013a) for solar for Germany; GSE (2013a) and GSE (2013b) for
biomass and solar for Italy; and UK Gov (2013) for UK. Note the different scales.
4Hydro is more or less constant over time in the model scenarios and in the NREAP projections and therefore not taken
into account in the figure.
B. Knopf et al.
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level of renewable deployment on a European-wide scale, but indicate that this
deployment for 2020 is generally less than envisaged in the NREAPs.
One remarkable discrepancy is seen, however, concerning the deployment of solar
PV in Germany and in Italy (see Fig. 3); model results tend to indicate much lower
contributions than the NREAPs. It becomes apparent, especially when comparing
model results to 2012 numbers, that solar PV deployment in Germany and Italy is
already much higher than projected in the models for 2020. What is the reason for this
discrepancy between the model results and the NREAPs and why is there such a
discrepancy between the models and current deployment levels? The following three
reasons can explain this discrepancy.
Firstly, most models concentrate on cost-optimal responses to the policies included
in the model. Based on current assumptions on the development of specific investment
costs, learning rates, and conversion efficiencies, the models consider solar PV as too
costly for it to be deployed on a large-scale level, certainly in Northern Europe. In
reality, however, the FIT systems installed in Germany and Italy providing high and
secure rates of return on investment, the differences in tax tariffs, and consumer pre-
ferences have led to a high deployment of solar PV. The tax difference also exists in
other countries, for example in the Netherlands, although there is no FIT. None of these
factors are explicitly considered in the models.
The second reason is limitations in the modeling itself, especially related to model
calibration. As can be seen for Germany and Italy for example, deployment levels of
the model median are below the actual level for 2012. Many models are calibrated to
the base year 2005 and may therefore not fully consider the significant progress that
has been made both in deployment and cost reductions during recent years, see e.g.,
Grau et al. (2012) and Bazilian et al. (2013). Investment costs for solar PV start with
levels as high as 4.200 €/kW for PRIMES or 6.300 €/kW for POLES in 2010, while in
Germany a decrease from 5.000 €/kW to 2.000 €/kW was experienced between 2006
and 2012 (Diekmann et al., 2012). So it might be that an updated calibration would
improve results. For comparison, investment costs for onshore wind are considered to
be much lower, with a maximum of 1.600 €/kW in 2010 for the different models.
Thirdly, the discrepancies might arise because the sole objective of the models is to
reduce GHG emissions. They do not take into account other reasons for PV deploy-
ment that might play a role in the real world and encourage policy makers to support
this particular technology. Such support may be driven by a perceived technology
potential and a market failure in pushing the technology down the cost curve.5 It may
also arise from consideration of co-benefits (GEA, 2012; Edenhofer et al., 2013c) such
as employment effects, local value added, additional environmental benefits and in-
dustrial policy (e.g., Machnig, 2011; Lehmann and Gawel, 2013; BMU, 2012b). Many
of these aspects are certainly important drivers for PV in Germany. Manufacturers and
5It is important to note that most models do not consider learning by doing endogenously, i.e., costs of the given
technology do not go down as a function of the cumulative deployment of that technology.
Transforming the European Energy System
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suppliers of solar PV plants had a world market share of 46% in 2011, reaching an
export rate of 87% (Wirth, 2012), and the PV sector provides more than one quarter of
all employment in the renewable energy sector (BMU, 2012a). This suggests there are
multiple objectives implicitly or explicitly considered by national policymakers in the
choice of renewable policies apart from GHG mitigation (Edenhofer et al., 2013b;
Pahle et al., 2012) and these other objectives are not captured by the models.On the
other hand, policy makers should carefully consider whether renewable deployment is
the most cost-efficient way of achieving other policy objectives that are associated with
renewables, e.g., “more indigenous energy sources, reduced energy import depen-
dence, and jobs and growth” as stated in the EU green paper on the 2030 framework
(European Commission, 2013a).
For biomass, a similar but less pronounced discrepancy as for PV can be seen
between actual electricity generation for 2012 and model results for 2020, as for
Germany, Italy, Sweden, and UK the model median hardly reaches the 2012 level.
Here the main reason is probably that in the models the limited available biomass is
used in the transport or the heating sector, but only to a limited extent in the electricity
sector where many other options are available.
While we have seen that current plans for wind in the NREAPs agree reasonably
well with the models, one issue is noteworthy that is specific for offshore wind power.
It plays an important role both in the NREAPs and in EMF28 model results and in the
three models that include offshore wind, it provides 41.3GW installed capacity by
2020 (NREAP) and an installed capacity of 22, 37, and 65GW by 2020 (EMF28).
However, so far only about 3GW have been installed at the EU level in 2010 (UK:
1.340MW, Denmark: 855MW), so the discrepancy between political targets and re-
ality is apparent (see also Schmid et al. (2013) for an analysis of the German case).
EMF28 models consider offshore wind power as a comparatively cost-efficient solution
as offshore locations come with high wind speeds that yield high feed-in, while the
expensive infrastructure investments in power grid connections are not taken into
account in detail in most models. Even though public aversion to onshore wind can
play a role in favoring offshore wind (see Toke, 2011), current deployment levels seem
too low to reach the 2020 target.
The recent report by the EU Commission on progress in renewable energy (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2013b) concludes that although interim targets for 2010 are met,
“more efforts will still be needed from the Member States in order to reach the 2020
targets”. In the context discussed above, it is interesting to note that in their analysis it
is considered likely that only PV deployment will meet the 2020 targets. Offshore wind
is expected to considerably lag behind.
3.2. Model projections for the long-term energy transformation
While the comparison with the NREAPs focuses on the short-term, we now concen-
trate on the long-term transformation leading up to 2050. For the five selected
B. Knopf et al.
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countries, the primary energy supply in 2050 required for an 80% reduction in GHG is
shown in Fig. 4. The share of different technologies in the mix differs considerably
between Member States in 2050 and is furthermore very different from the aggregated
EU27 energy mix from the Energy Roadmap, that is given for comparison. Common
findings are the strong decrease in the share of oil by 2050. This combines with an
almost complete phase-out of the use of coal on the one hand, and the strong increase
in both bio-energy and non-biomass renewables (NBR) on the other hand. The dif-
ferences in model scenarios between the Member States become apparent in the
electricity mix (Fig. 5) which indicates that shares for fossil fuels with CCS, nuclear,
wind, and hydro, vary considerably among Member States.
Some general conclusions can be drawn from these five selected countries. In the
model scenarios, countries that currently rely primarily on coal or gas undergo a
substantial transformation towards biomass, NBR and CCS (e.g., Germany and the
UK). In countries that already apply low carbon technologies such as nuclear (in
France) or large-scale hydro (as in Sweden) the trend continues in the scenarios. Italy,
as a gas-based country, undergoes a shift to gas-CCS in some models, but in others the
electricity mix continues to include a considerable amount of gas without CCS. It
seems that there is a substantial deviation between the proportions of individual
technologies derived from the model scenarios for the different Member States, and the
Figure 4. Percentage share of different technologies for primary energy production for the
EU27 and the five selected countries in 2050 for the models given in Table 1. The dotted line
represents the median, the box contains the 50% interval, the whiskers mark the 90% interval,
and the dots mark the extreme values. The horizontal line indicates the numbers from the
Energy Roadmap for the EU27.
Transforming the European Energy System
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aggregate of those given in the Energy Roadmap for the EU27 (see horizontal bar in
Figs. 4 and 5). Despite the fact that technology deployment in each selected country is
very different and the reduction of carbon intensity is diverse across countries (see
Fig. 6, right), the reduction of energy intensity is of considerable importance across all
five countries (see Fig. 6, right).
In the following, we relate the model results in more detail to the national policies of
the selected Member States described in Secs. 2.1 to 2.4. Overall, the models capture
the national differences quite well.
Comparing the EMF28 scenarios for France with the national policies, it transpires
that nuclear energy will clearly continue to play an important role in the future energy
mix of France, in line with the view of analysts, energy experts, industry, and politi-
cians. Only the EMELIE-ESY model projects a low (27%) level of nuclear by 2050
due to its capital costs being around 50% higher than those assumed in the Energy
Roadmap. CCS plays only a minor role in the model scenarios with a share of fossil
CCS in the electricity mix lower than 6% and a maximum captured emissions of 120
MtCO2 in 2050. This development is consistent with current perceptions of CCS in
France. Nonetheless, despite considerable CCS potential, the future of CCS technol-
ogy in France depends on the successful demonstration of pilot projects, public ac-
ceptance and, on the appropriate carbon price. All models expect RES to contribute a
sizeable proportion of the electricity mix, i.e., 26–70% by 2050.
Figure 5. Percentage share of different technologies for electricity production for the EU27 and
the five selected countries in 2050 for the models given in Table 1. The dotted line represents
the median, the box contains the 50% interval, the whiskers mark the 90% interval, and the dots
mark the extreme values. The horizontal line indicates the numbers from the Energy Roadmap
for the EU27.
B. Knopf et al.
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In the case of Germany, the nuclear phase-out by 2022 is well covered by the
EMF28 scenarios, but they show a much slower development of the share of RES in
the electricity sector than envisaged by German law. This is particularly the case for
solar PV, see discussion in Sec. 3.1. With its renewable FIT system, Germany has an
effective policy instrument to trigger the deployment of renewables that by the end of
2012 made up 21.9% of the electricity mix. However, EMF28 scenarios only indicate a
median share of 67% RES by 2050 rather than the envisaged 80%. On the contrary,
CCS technology, which plays a prominent role in the EMF28 model results, achieved a
share of more than 20% and 230 MtCO2 of captured emissions in 2050. For com-
parison, the remaining CO2 emissions are roughly 130 MtCO2 in 2050, so a much
larger proportion is projected to be captured than emitted. However, these high levels
are currently unlikely to be realized in Germany, as the attempt to implement legis-
lation for CCS failed in 2011. Public opposition and a lack of political will are reasons
for this failure (von Hirschhausen et al., 2012). EMF28 results indicate a great im-
portance of gas in the future power system. In Germany, there is an ongoing discussion
Figure 6. Reduction of carbon intensity (CO2 per primary energy, left) and energy intensity
(primary energy per GDP, right) between 2050 and 2010 for the five selected countries for the
models given in Table 1. The dotted line is the median, the box contains the 50% interval, the
whiskers mark the 90% interval, and the dots mark the extreme values. The horizontal line
indicates the numbers from the Energy Roadmap for the EU27.
Transforming the European Energy System
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as to whether gas plants remain profitable in an energy market which has a high share
of variable RES. The debate is whether a so-called capacity mechanism for conven-
tional, dispatchable technologies should be implemented (Flinkerbusch and Scheffer,
2012). The future German electricity mix will certainly depend on this strategically
important decision.
In Italy, as in Germany, the FIT RES supporting scheme has triggered an enormous
deployment of renewables, especially solar PV. The rejection of nuclear in Italy is
taken into account in the EMF28 model scenarios (except the model POLES which
indicates a very low capacity of 2GW by 2050). Most EMF28 models apply the CCS
option in combination with natural gas, which contributes a considerable share of
around 20% in the Italian electricity mix by 2050.
In the EMF28 scenarios, the Swedish electricity mix is largely composed of RES
and nuclear although the shares differ between the models (see Fig. 5). The deploy-
ment of CCS in the model scenarios is limited. Among renewables, hydropower is the
most important component with a model median of more than 50% of the electricity
production in 2050. Altogether, the median share of RES electricity production is
about 60% in 2020 and 70% in 2050. Sweden already has a large share of carbon-free
technologies and, according to the models, still a great potential for CO2 reduction, so
the need for reduction of energy intensity is much smaller than in the other countries
(Fig. 6), whereas carbon intensity decreases considerably.
As described in Sec. 2.5, the UK does not exclude any of the main technology
options and therefore different future transitions could be considered plausible and few
options can be excluded in advance. EMF28 scenarios capture this by showing a quite
balanced and diversified mix, with similar shares for gas, coal, renewables, and nu-
clear deployment. Interestingly, the UK electricity mix appears to be a good proxy for
the EU27 energy mix produced by the models. However, the requirement for reducing
energy intensity is much higher than the European median (Fig. 6, right).
Overall, we can conclude that there is sufficient agreement between the NREAPs
and national policies to accept the model results as conceivable scenarios for the
different Member States.
4. Policy Implications
In this section, we deduce some policy implications that can be derived from the
modeling results. According to the models, we may continue to see a variety of
national energy mixes in the future, reflecting the different resource bases of the
Member States. This diversity may remain even under an EU-wide GHG reduction
target. The models assume that the challenge and the implicit tension of contributing to
the overall European target, given the diversity between Member States’ policies and
preferences, can be solved in a fully cooperative way among EU Member States. In
order to realize this, some implicit assumptions in the models have to be transferred
into policy and action. In the following, we therefore relate the model results to three
B. Knopf et al.
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key areas of European cooperation: the grid infrastructure, the internal energy market,
and the design of policy instruments.
The model results depend on the assumption that technologies available can be
deployed in a cost-efficient manner, under full where- and when-flexibility (see
Sec. 1.1). The implicit presumption behind this is that the electricity infrastructure is
not a bottleneck and that grid connection is fully available. In this way, cheaper energy
sources can be developed in one country and transported to another whenever the
model finds it cost-optimal to do so. In reality, the physical infrastructure in many areas
of Europe is still a major barrier for transnational exchange and considerable invest-
ments are needed. In the latest 10-Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP), the
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E)
identifies the need to invest €104 billion in the refurbishment or construction of
roughly 52,300 km of extra high voltage power lines clustered into 100 investment
projects across Europe (ENTSO-E, 2012). In addition to the economic challenge in-
volved in realizing these investments, there is also a serious public opposition to new
overhead lines in most regions of Europe.
The models also assume a fully functioning internal energy market. The EU is
committed to a fully integrated energy market by 2014, but international wholesale
electricity markets only exist in some regions of Europe: the NordPool region (Nor-
way, Sweden, Denmark, Finland), Central Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Ger-
many, France, Netherlands, Switzerland), Central Eastern Europe (with market
coupling between Slovenia, Czech Republic, and Hungary), as well as wholesale
trading between Spain — Portugal and UK — Ireland. Electricity trade and cross-
border flow increased by 7% in the second half of 2012 compared to the same period
in 2011 (DG-Energy, 2013). This illustrates the increasing integration of the European
electricity markets. Traded volumes in the European wholesale electricity markets have
been growing continuously since 2005, with total traded volume in 2012 exceeding
1200 TWh. However, this represents just 43% of European annual electricity con-
sumption, so there is still some way to go before the market is fully integrated.
We can also draw some conclusions for the design of policy instruments. We have
seen that the aggregated EU27 energy mix gives only a rough indication of which
technologies are important for energy transformation in each individual Member State.
The EU Energy Roadmap can therefore only provide limited guidance for the im-
plementation of such transformation pathways at a national level. At the same time,
there seem to be a number of technologies that are becoming increasingly important in
all Member States. From our model analysis, we can indicate which technologies may
actually be promoted based on their expected long-term potential across all countries.
These include bio-energy, CCS, and energy efficiency improvements. Although overall
NBR increase in all Member States, the picture on the individual NBR technologies
varies considerably. This diversity might pose a challenge for the implementation of
European policy instruments additional to that of the European emissions trading
scheme.
Transforming the European Energy System
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In order to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation in the EU, given such
diversity, it is important to improve alignment between EU-level and national Member
State policies. This could include a review of the EU emission trading scheme and
national renewable subsidy schemes, with the aim of reducing mitigation costs below
current levels (Edenhofer et al., 2013a). However, this topic goes beyond the analysis
of this study and points towards a new direction of research. When it comes to
implementation of the technology pathways and to the design of policy instruments
and measures, the different levels of governance between the EU and its Member
States have to be considered. This leads to the questions of: (i) the level to which
mitigation policies should best be assigned, (ii) how the different levels should interact
and (iii) how coordination between different levels can be achieved. Despite national
sovereignty over the energy mix laid down in Article 194 and the fact that subsidiarity
is the guiding principle of the EU, the idea of polycentric governance (Ostrom, 2010)
can provide a new perspective. This perspective takes into account the existence of
multiple political actors at different governance levels (i.e., the EU and Member
States). In Shobe and Burtraw’s (2012) analysis of environmental federalism, for
example, they conclude that policies that take advantage of the federal structure of the
heterogeneity of costs and preferences at different governance levels can improve
climate policy outcomes. Further research in this direction is required in order to
facilitate the European energy transition.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we relate national mitigation scenarios to the long-term European energy
transformation. Our analysis is based on the EMF28 multi-model assessment, in-
cluding six models with different economic coverage and solution methods, and
concentrates on five selected Member States (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and
UK) as case studies. Firstly, we analyzed national climate and energy policy objectives
and debates in the respective countries. We then related EMF28 model results to these
national perspectives and compared model projections with both the short-term pro-
jections of the NREAPs and the long-term transformation pathway given in the Eu-
ropean Commission’s “Energy Roadmap 2050”. Three main conclusions can be drawn
from the analysis: (i) the models are by and large able to capture national differences
that are compatible with current policies; one noteworthy discrepancy is concerning
current deployment of solar PV in some countries; (ii) as national energy mixes will
continue to reflect the different resource bases and preferences of individual Member
States, the aggregated European pathway provided by the Energy Roadmap gives only
limited guidance for policy implementation at the Member State level; (iii) ensuring a
cost-efficient transformation of the European energy system is tantamount to in-
creasing the level of cooperation between Member States and the EU level in terms of
infrastructure expansion, fostering the internal energy market and the coordination of
the design of policy instruments.
B. Knopf et al.
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The analysis of the national policies and roadmaps that are currently implemented in
the five selected countries revealed that they differ considerably in terms of ambition,
scope, and preference concerning specific technology choices. Relating the model results
to these national policies and to the NREAPs, which provide the short-term visions of the
different Member States on the deployment of renewables, shows that the models are
indeed able to capture national differences. With some exceptions, for example the
deployment of CCS in Germany at high levels that is currently unlikely to be realized,
there is generally sufficient agreement with national policies to credit the model results as
being conceivable scenarios for the different Member States. However, an important
discrepancy concerning solar PV is revealed. The contribution from PV is considerably
lower in themodels compared to current and projected deployment levels. Despite the fact
that the models do not take into account supporting schemes for renewables and therefore
underestimate the current development of solar PV, this discrepancy might also indicate
that the model objective of reducing GHG emissions might not be the only reason for
selecting a particular technology. In reality, there are other factors and assumed co-
benefits, such as local employment effects, local value added, additional environmental
benefits, and industrial policy which are taken into consideration. Therefore, although the
models seem to capture national differences reasonably well, it would be important to
acknowledge the existence of multi-objectives in the models. On the other hand, policy
makers should carefully considerwhether renewable deployment is themost cost-efficient
way of achieving the other policy objectives that are associated with renewables.
Many recent studies on the energy transformation in Europe focus on the top–down
perspective by considering Europe as an entity and concentrating on the aggregated
EU27 energy mix. Our model-based analysis at the national level, however, shows that
the strategies for transforming the energy system vary considerably across Member
States. National differences in energy mix, for example due to different political pre-
ferences or resource availabilities, are likely to continue to play a dominant role in the
future through lock-ins and path dependencies for specific technologies. In that sense
the EU27 energy mix is not a good indicator of how to achieve the energy transition in
individual countries. Our analysis showed that the transformation pathways at the
Member State level indeed differ substantially from the aggregated European per-
spective laid down in the Energy Roadmap of the European Commission.
This discrepancy indicates that the Energy Roadmap provides only limited guidance
for implementation of policy measures in Member States. For the design of policy
instruments — both at European and national level — it is of pivotal importance to
link the European energy transition to those of individual Member States and vice
versa. Therefore, much more work on national roadmaps and the development of
national scenarios is needed. Scenarios at the national level may also help to identify
interdependencies where enhanced collaborations between countries may be desirable
in terms of costs and for the ultimate goal of reaching the mitigation target. Regional
cooperation might be a way to initiate this. The penta-lateral cooperation in Northwest
Europe (Belgium, France Germany, Luxemburg, and Netherlands) and cooperation
Transforming the European Energy System
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among Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) are such examples of
regional cooperation, but potential for further regional cooperation exits. In this con-
text, the development of grid infrastructure is also important in order to reap the
benefits of regional disparity and geographic differences e.g., concerning the renew-
able resource potential.
Finally, we gave an overview on how to improve coordination and alignment be-
tween EU-level and national Member State policies. For the design of policy instru-
ments, the different levels of governance between the EU and its Member States have
to be considered. This leads to the questions of: (i) the level of governance to which
mitigation policies should best be assigned, (ii) how the different levels should interact
and (iii) how coordination between different levels can be achieved. These questions
are addressed in the research field of environmental federalism, which deserves more
attention in order to reap the benefits of cooperation between Member States and the
EU as a whole in the context of a low-carbon energy transition.
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